

ATTRIBUTIVE USES OF PROSENTENCES

James R. Beebe

Abstract

Defenders of the prosentential theory of truth claim that the English language contains prosentences which function analogously to their better known cousins – pronouns. Statements such as ‘That is true’ or ‘It is true’, they claim, inherit their content from antecedent statements, just as pronouns inherit their reference from antecedent singular terms. Prosentential theorists claim that the content of these prosentences is exhausted by the content of their antecedents. They then use the notion of the inheritance of content from an antecedent to explain the various functions of the predicate ‘... is true’. Defenders of the prosentential theory of truth are mistaken, I claim, in thinking that in order to oppose the view that ‘... is true’ is used to ascribe a substantive truth property to propositions they need to claim that no uses of ‘... is true’ ever attribute any property. I identify an ‘attributive’ use of prosentences in which reliability is implicitly attributed to a subject. I then use the capacity of prosentences to serve as implicit attributions of reliability as a basis for explicating the logical structure of explicit attributions of reliability. The identification of an attributive use of prosentences does not constitute a fundamental change in the prosentential theory.

I.

Defenders of the prosentential theory of truth mistakenly think that in order to oppose the view that uses of the truth predicate ascribe a substantive truth property to propositions they need to claim that no uses of the truth predicate ever attribute any property. *Pace* the prosentential theory of truth, I shall argue that prosentences are not always used to say what their anaphoric antecedents say. I identify an ‘attributive’ use of quantificational prosentences in which *reliability* in some restricted domain is ascribed to a subject. The property of reliability is not expressed by any of the conditional assertions which are the substitution instances of basic prosentences nor by any conjunction of such instances. However, as I will show, a subtle change in the focus of

one's assertion from the content being conditionally asserted to the subject of the condition constraining the assertion turns a quantificational presentence into an implicit attribution of reliability. I then use the capacity of presentences to serve as implicit attributions of reliability as a basis for explicating the logical structure of explicit attributions of reliability. The identification of an attributive use of presentences does not constitute a fundamental change in the presentential theory of truth and poses no threat to its basic deflationary aim.

II.

The presentential theory of truth – first developed by Grover, Camp, and Belnap (1975) and Grover (1992) – has recently been revived by Brandom (1994, 2000). According to the theory, the English language contains *presentences* which function analogously to their better known cousins – *pronouns*. For example,

- (1) Bill: There are people on Mars. Mary: *That is true.*
- (2) John: Bill claims that there are people on Mars but I don't believe that *it is true.*

In these examples, 'that is true' and 'it is true' serve as 'presentences of laziness'. They inherit their content from antecedent statements, just as pronouns inherit their reference from antecedent singular terms. John's use of 'it is true' is lazy because he could have easily repeated the content of Bill's claim without using a presentence. For example,

- (2') John: Bill claims that there are people on Mars but I don't believe that there are people on Mars.

The central claim of the presentential theory is that '*. . . is true*' functions as a presentence-forming operator rather than as a property-ascribing locution. Whenever a definite description, quote-name, that-clause sortal or some other device that picks out an antecedent sentence is joined to the truth predicate, presententialists claim that the resulting expression contains no more content than the antecedent sentence(s) denoted by the referring expression (Brandom 1994: 300). According to the presentential theory, sentences (3), (4) and (5) say no more than sentences (6), (7) and (8), respectively.

- (3) Goldbach's conjecture is true.
- (4) 'Snow is white' is true.

- (5) The claim that grass is green is true.
- (6) Every even number is the sum of two primes.
- (7) Snow is white.
- (8) Grass is green.

The disquotational theory of truth is designed to deal only with cases such as (4) that contain quote-names of sentences but cannot straightforwardly handle cases such as (3) and (5) where there are no quotation marks to be removed. The prosentential theory treats disquotational uses of the truth predicate as one kind of anaphora among many. Note also that standard forms of the redundancy theory cannot handle cases such as (3) where the truth predicate cannot be easily eliminated. The elimination of ‘... is true’ from (3) yields ‘Goldbach’s conjecture’, which is not a grammatical sentence (cf. Brandom 1994: 300). Thus, both redundancy and disquotational theories focus on mere subsets of the uses of the truth predicate; prosentential theories cover all such uses.

Although the semantic content of prosentences and their antecedents is the same, prosentences often differ in pragmatic respects from their antecedents. Consider the difference between the following cases:

- (1) Bill: There are people on Mars. Mary: *That is true.*
- (1') Bill: There are people on Mars. Mary: There are people on Mars.

Although Mary’s utterance in (1') asserts no more than her utterance in (1), her utterance in (1') does not acknowledge that Bill has said anything. By acknowledging Bill’s previous statement, Mary’s utterance of ‘that is true’ avoids a kind of assertional plagiarism and has the effect of expressing agreement. Mary could have uttered her statement in (1') without ever having heard Bill say anything and without, therefore, expressing any kind of agreement. Thus, the prosentential theory takes up the point emphasized by F. P. Ramsey’s redundancy theory that uses of prosentences do not assert anything new. Unlike redundancy theories, however, the prosentential theory does not take the truth predicate to be always eliminable without loss.

One of the prosentential theory’s most important claims about the truth predicate is that it is *not* used to ascribe a substantive property to propositions. Grover writes,

Many other truth theories assume that a sentence containing a truth predication, e.g., ‘That is true’, is about its antecedent

sentence ('Chicago is large') or an antecedent proposition. By contrast, the prosentential account is that 'That is true' does not say anything about its antecedent sentence (e.g., 'Chicago is large') but says something about an extralinguistic subject (e.g., Chicago). (Grover 1992: 221)

As Grover puts it, prosentences function 'at the level of the object language' (Grover 1992: 221).¹ Quine (1970: 10–11) makes a similar claim, stating that the truth predicate serves 'to point through the sentence to reality; it serves as a reminder that though sentences are mentioned, reality is still the whole point'. The prosentential theory uses the notion of the anaphoric inheritance of content to explain how reality remains the focus in such cases.

III.

In addition to lazy uses of prosentences, there are also 'quantificational' uses. For example,

(9) Everything John said is true.

Translated into a language containing bound propositional variables, (9) reads

(10) $\forall p$ (If John said that p , then p is true).

A natural language paraphrase of (10) which exhibits 'it is true' as a quantificationally dependent prosentence would be

(11) For anything one can say, if John said it, then it is true.
(Grover 1992: 130)

The quantificational prosentence picks up its content from a set of admissible substituends – viz., things John said. Brandom writes,

Each quantificational instance of this quantificational claim can be understood in terms of the lazy functioning of prosentences, and the quantificational claim is related to those instances in the usual conjunctive way. (Brandom 1994: 302)

¹ Even when someone makes an utterance such as 'John's last claim is true' – which uses a referring expression that explicitly mentions an antecedent utterance token – the prosentential theory still denies that it is the utterance that is being talked about. The person uttering this sentence 'expresses an opinion about whatever (extralinguistic thing) it was that John expressed an opinion about' (Grover 1992: 19).

In other words, in using a quantificational prosentence, one is committing oneself to each of the results of replacing the proform by some admissible substituend (ibid.: 301).

Since, according to the prosentential theory, the statement ' p is true' says no more than the statement ' p ', then the truth predicate in (10) can be dropped to yield

(10') $\forall p(\text{If John said that } p, \text{ then } p)$.

If the variable ' p ' ranges over objects and takes names of objects as its substitution instances, then the consequent of the conditional inside (10') will not be a grammatical expression. In order to turn (10') into a grammatical expression, two modifications must be made. First, the variable ' p ' must be understood to be a propositional variable, taking entire propositions instead of names of propositions as its substitution instances. Secondly, the quantifier ' $\forall p$ ' must be understood substitutionally, since the objectual interpretation of the quantifiers does not square well with the use of propositional variables. A statement using the particular substitutional quantifier is true just in case the open sentence following the quantifier has at least one true substitution instance; while a statement using the universal substitutional quantifier is true in case every substitution instance is true (cf. David 1994: 85).² In order to avoid confusion between the objectual and substitutional interpretations of the quantifiers, I shall use ' Πp ' to designate the universal substitutional quantifier. (10'), then, should read

(10'') $\Pi p(\text{If John said that } p, \text{ then } p)$.

IV.

Universally quantified statements can be understood as conjunctions of their substitution instances. How many conjuncts make up the content of (10'') will depend upon the size of the domain of discourse in question. Above we gave the ordinary English reading of (10) as

² Alternatively,

The notation ' $(\Sigma p)(\dots p \dots)$ ' encodes the disjunction of the open or closed sentences that result from replacing the free occurrences of ' p ' in ' $(\dots p \dots)$ ' by expressions e

The notation ' $(\Pi p)(\dots p \dots)$ ' encodes the conjunction of the open or closed sentences that result from replacing the free occurrences of ' p ' in ' $(\dots p \dots)$ ' by expressions e . (David 1994: 107)

(11) For anything one can say, if John said it, then it is true.

If the domain of ' p ' is the set of all things that can be said, then (10'') will consist of an indefinitely large conjunction of substitution instances. Most of the conjuncts will be vacuously true by virtue of having false antecedents – i.e., there will be indefinitely many things that John did not say. This means that each of the indefinitely many conditionals formed from things that John did not say is just as much part of the content of (9) and (10'') as each of the conditionals formed from things John did say. That seems counterintuitive and contrary to the meanings of (9) and (10''). Suppose that John made only the following three statements on the occasion in question.

(12) Gas prices are too high.

(13) Taxes are too high.

(14) Professional baseball players' salaries are too high.

It is plausible to think that (10'') says something about (12), (13) and (14) but not about (15), (16) and (17) – statements John never made.

(15) Gas prices are too low.

(16) Taxes are too low.

(17) Professional baseball players' salaries are too low.

Yet if the quantification in (10'') remains unrestricted, then its content consists at least in part of conditionals having (15), (16), (17) and countless other statements John did not say in their antecedents.

If quantificational prosentences such as 'Everything John said is true' are to refer to only finite classes of claims, their quantifiers must be restricted in some way. One way to trim down the domain of ' p ' in (10'') is to limit the universe of discourse to the set of all statements made by John.

(10''') $\Pi p(\text{If John said that } p, \text{ then } p)$. $U_J = \{p \mid \text{John said } p\}$

' $\Pi p(\text{If John said that } p, \text{ then } p)$ ' will consist of a finite conjunction of true conditionals, one for each thing said by John on the occasion in question. This arrangement, however, has the unusual feature that, for every x , the universe of discourse will be different for every statement of the form

(18) $\Pi p(\text{If } x \text{ said that } p, \text{ then } p)$. $U_x = \{p \mid x \text{ said } p\}$

Other quantificational prosentences that count as instances of (18) include

- (19) Everything the Pope says about theological doctrine is true.
 (20) Everything Henry Kissinger says about foreign policy is true.

Following the current suggestion, (19) could be symbolized as either

- (21) $\Pi p(\text{If the Pope said that } p, \text{ then } p).$
 $U_P = \{p \mid \text{the Pope said } p \ \& \ p \text{ is a matter of theological doctrine}\}$

or

- (21') $\Pi p(\text{If the Pope said that } p \ \& \ p \text{ is a matter of theological doctrine, then } p).$
 $U_P = \{p \mid \text{the Pope said } p\}$

The symbolization for (20) would be analogous. It is not clear that we will be able to capture what is common to each of these cases if each quantificational prosentence is tied to a distinct universe of discourse. Perhaps there is another way to limit the domain of ' p ' in (10").

To solve the problem of restricted quantification – i.e., where one wants to quantify over only a limited domain – Nuel Belnap (1973) introduces the notation ' (A/B) ' to stand for conditional assertion. Conditional assertion occurs when someone does not assert the conditional 'If A then B ' as much as conditionally assert B – that is, assert B on the condition that A . Belnap formulates the following principle to capture this idea:

- (B1) If A is true, then what (A/B) asserts is what B asserts. If A is false, then (A/B) is nonassertive.³ (Belnap 1973: 50)

Quantifying into conditional assertions yields a restricted form of quantification, regarding which Belnap offers the following principle

³ Actually, (B1) is simply a first pass at capturing the semantics of conditional assertion. Belnap's considered opinion about conditional assertion is much more complicated and can better handle a wide variety of cases (e.g., when conditional assertions are embedded in the antecedents or consequents of conditional assertions), but the simple version will serve our purposes because it presents the central idea behind the semantics of conditional assertion most conspicuously.

- (B2) Part 1. $(\forall x)(Cx/Bx)$ is assertive just in case $\exists xCx$ is true.
 Part 2. $(\forall x)(Cx/Bx)$ is the conjunction of all the propositions (Bt) such that Ct is true.⁴ (ibid.: 66)

Applying Belnap's conditional assertion notation to (10) yields

- (22) $\Pi p(\text{John said that } p/p)$.

Belnap's principle of restricted quantification solves the problem of how to interpret 'Everything John said is true'. The content, then, of (22) is a finite conjunction of claims. But notice that it is not a conjunction of conditionals of the form 'If John said that p , then p ', each with a true antecedent. Rather, it is a conjunction of claims p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n , each of which satisfies the condition that John said it. The focus of such a claim is on what John said and only derivatively on the fact that it was John who did the saying. If the only statements John made were (12), (13) and (14), then the content of an assertion of (22) is exhausted by the conjunction of (12), (13) and (14). This also has the consequence that (22) isn't saying anything about John. Applying Belnap's principle of conditional assertion to (19) and (20) yields

- (23) $\Pi p(\text{the Pope said that } p \ \& \ p \text{ is a matter of theological doctrine}/p)$.
 (24) $\Pi p(\text{Kissinger said that } p \ \& \ p \text{ is a matter of foreign policy}/p)$.

Following Belnap's interpretation of conditional assertion and restricted quantification, prosentential theorists can explain how quantificational prosentences have as their content finite conjunctions of claims rather than infinite conjunctions of conditionals, most of which are trivially true.

V.

When the focus of assertions such as

- (9) Everything John said is true.
 (19) Everything the Pope says about theological doctrine is true.
 (20) Everything Henry Kissinger says about foreign policy is true.

⁴ I have modified Belnap's statement of this principle slightly by omitting subscripts which index truth and content to worlds and using different symbols for the quantifiers.

is on *what* is being said by John, the Pope or Kissinger, the standard prosentential line that the content of quantificational pro-sentences is exhausted by the conjunction of their anaphoric antecedents will be appropriate. For example, if someone wanted to express agreement with John's claims that gas prices, taxes and professional baseball players' salaries are too high, an assertion of (9) would accomplish the desired purpose. If matters of faith are being disputed and one wishes to signal disagreement with those expressing unorthodox opinions, one can assert (19). Asserting (20) can signal opposition to someone casting doubt on Kissinger's advice regarding U.S. relations with China. In each case it is plausible to take some set of anaphoric antecedents as exhausting the content of the claims being made. However, these quantificational pro-sentences need not always be used to assert the conjunctions of claims made by these gentlemen.

Clearly, (9), (19) and (20) can also be used to say something about *John, the Pope* and *Henry Kissinger*. If George W. asked, 'Why should I care what Kissinger thinks about my approach to U.S.-China relations?' his advisors can answer with an assertion of (20). The implication of their answer is that Kissinger is worth listening to because he is highly *reliable* in matters of foreign policy. If, after being instructed in a piece of the Pope's teaching, a catechumen wonders why she should accept this teaching, the faithful may reply with (19). The implication of this reply is that papal infallibility (i.e., the Pope's perfect *reliability*) is sufficient reason to believe. In such cases, Bush's advisors and the teachers of the Catholic faith can use statements such as (19) and (20) to draw attention to attributes of Kissinger and the Pope. They are not interested merely in co-asserting the anaphors of these pro-sentences. By explicitly saying that things stand in the world as John, the Pope or Kissinger say they stand, one can say something implicitly about John, the Pope or Kissinger – viz., that these gentlemen are reliable. In such cases, the focus of the assertion shifts away from the class of conditioned assertions to the subject in the condition constraining the quantification. Call these instances 'attributive' uses of quantificational pro-sentences because they are used to make implicit attributions of reliability to the subjects of the conditions. I shall designate uses of quantificational pro-sentences as 'non-attributive' when they are used to co-assert the anaphors of the pro-sentences.

Attributive uses of quantificational pro-sentences are closely related to explicit attributions of reliability. An intention to

attribute reliability can be made explicit with the use of a reliability predicate. Instead of using the prosentences (9), (19) and (20) attributively, one could make the following explicit attributions of reliability.

- (25) John is perfectly reliable concerning those matters about which he spoke.
- (26) The Pope is perfectly reliable in matters of theological doctrine.
- (27) Kissinger is perfectly reliable in matters of foreign policy.

In each case the reliability predicate indicates that the speaker is not so much interested in the fact that the world is as one of these men say it is but that the man in question is reliable. For the sake of simplicity, I am making the unrealistic assumption that each of these gentlemen is perfectly reliable in a certain domain. I will deal with attributions of less than perfect reliability below.

We saw above that quantificational prosentences (9), (19) and (20) are properly symbolized as

- (22) $\Pi p(\text{John said that } p/p)$.
- (23) $\Pi p(\text{the Pope said that } p \ \& \ p \text{ is a matter of theological doctrine}/p)$.
- (24) $\Pi p(\text{Kissinger said that } p \ \& \ p \text{ is a matter of foreign policy}/p)$.

The explicit attributions of reliability expressed by (25), (26) and (27) are equivalent to the following statements which employ a device of semantic ascent in combination with the quantificational prosentences expressed by (22), (23) and (24). In each of them reliability is attributed to the subject of the condition constraining the quantification in (22), (23) and (24).

- (28) John satisfies the predicate⁵ ' $\Pi p(x \text{ said that } p/p)$ '.
- (29) The Pope satisfies the predicate ' $\Pi p(x \text{ said that } p \ \& \ p \text{ is a matter of theological doctrine}/p)$ '.
- (30) Kissinger satisfies the predicate ' $\Pi p(x \text{ said that } p \ \& \ p \text{ is a matter of foreign policy}/p)$ '.

(28), (29) and (30) are equivalent to (25), (26) and (27) because there is no more to the notion of reliability (as it is used in reliabilist epistemology) than what is captured in the predicates of

⁵ I follow Quine (1972) in taking a predicate to be any open sentence formed by replacing a singular term in a closed sentence with a variable.

(28), (29) and (30). In fact, (28), (29) and (30) can be understood to be analyses of (25), (26) and (27).

The locution ‘... satisfies the predicate ...’, like all devices of semantic ascent, brings increased expressive power to a language. It enables speakers to say something about John, the Pope and Kissinger that they cannot say with statements such as (22), (23) and (24). Since the notion of reliability can be analyzed into a quantificational prosentence and a locution expressing predicate satisfaction, the reliability predicate can be viewed as performing the role of a device of semantic ascent in a disguised fashion.

Before proceeding, let me be clear about the three kinds of statement I am distinguishing:

- (a) *non-attributive uses of quantificational prosentences*, in which the focus of an assertion of a quantificational prosentence is on *what* is being asserted by the conjunction of the prosentence’s anaphoric antecedents;
- (b) *attributive uses of quantificational prosentences*, in which reliability is being implicitly attributed to the subject of the condition restricting the quantifier in a quantificational prosentence; and
- (c) *explicit attributions of reliability*, which employ a reliability predicate and make explicit what is implicitly attributed in statements of type (b).

All statements of types (a) and (b) that we have discussed⁶ are instances of the schemata

$$(31) \Pi p(S \text{ said that } p/p)$$

or

$$(31') \Pi p(S \text{ said that } p \ \& \ \psi p/p),$$

where ‘ ψp ’ is a factor restricting the domain of S ’s reliability – e.g., ‘... is a matter of theological doctrine’ or ‘... is a matter of foreign policy’. Statements of type (c) are analyzed as instances of the schemata

$$(32) S \text{ satisfies the predicate } \text{‘}\Pi p(x \text{ said that } p/p)\text{’}$$

⁶ I am making the simplifying assumption that quantificational prosentences always have as their anaphoric antecedents some set of statements asserted by a single person. This is not always the case, but it would needlessly complicate my analysis to include discussion of other cases.

or

(32') S satisfies the predicate ' $\Pi p(x \text{ said that } p \ \& \ \psi p/p)$ '.

I follow prosententialists in thinking that, strictly speaking, there is no difference in content between a presentence that is used attributively [type (b)] and that same presentence used non-attributively [type (a)] because the logical form and conceptual content of the presentence is the same in each case. However, I claim that uses of the reliability predicate *explicitly assert* something that is merely *implicit* in quantificational presentences. The symbolizations of quantificational presentences and the analyses of explicit attributions of reliability above make clear how closely connected are attributive uses of presentences and explicit attributions of reliability. A quantificational presentence that can be used attributively as an implicit attribution of reliability – e.g.,

(22) $\Pi p(\text{John said that } p/p)$

– *shows* that the object named by some singular term satisfies the predicate in question, but presentences do not allow speakers to *say* that they are attributing reliability to that subject. The analyses of explicit attributions of reliability, however, *say* that the objects denoted by certain singular terms satisfy the predicates in question. For instance,

(28) John satisfies the predicate ' $\Pi p(x \text{ said that } p/p)$ '.

The conceptual content of quantificational presentences such as (22) differ from analyses of explicit attributions of reliability such as (28) only very slightly. The latter employ the semantic notion of predicate satisfaction, while the former do not. The latter also mention a predicate that the former uses. But the conceptual content of the predicates themselves and the singular terms used in each case are identical. The predicate ' \dots is reliable' and the semantic locution ' \dots satisfies the predicate \dots ' merely play *expressive roles*, enabling speakers to say things about conceptual contents they would not otherwise be able to say.⁷

The distinction between attributive and non-attributive uses of presentences does not map neatly onto the Gricean distinction between what *a speaker means* and what *the speaker's words mean*. A burglar, for example, can use the words 'The cops are around the

⁷ Cf. Brandom (1994, ch. 5) for more discussion of the expressive role of semantic vocabulary.

corner' to mean 'Let's split!'; but what the words mean and what the speaker means will not be the same. In contrast, the words employed in non-attributive uses of quantificational prosentences can be used to *explicate the meaning* of attributions of reliability (whether made implicitly by using a prosentence attributively or explicitly by using the reliability predicate). For example, if someone were to ask for an explication of (27) – i.e., of what it means for Kissinger to be perfectly reliable in matters of foreign policy – we could offer (20) or (24) as an answer. Being perfectly reliable in that domain just means that everything he says regarding that domain is true. The connection between non-attributive uses of prosentences, on the one hand, and attributive uses of prosentences and explicit attributions of reliability, on the other, is tighter than the connection between what words mean and what speakers can use those words to mean. It is tighter because attributive uses of prosentences and explicit attributions of reliability represent varying degrees of explicating what is implicit in quantificational prosentences used non-attributively.

VI.

Thus far I have dealt only with attributions of perfect reliability – i.e., infallibility. Since the most that we can expect from reliable, human cognitive processes is that most of the beliefs they produce will be true, attributions of perfect reliability will not be common. We can analyze attributions of less than perfect reliability as

(33) *S* satisfies the predicate ' $\mathbf{M}p(x \text{ said that } p/p)$ '

or

(33') *S* satisfies the predicate ' $\mathbf{M}p(x \text{ said that } p \ \& \ \psi p/p)$ ',

where ' $\mathbf{M}p(\Phi p)$ ' mean that most of the substitution instances of ' Φp ' are true.⁸ Unlike statements using the universal or existential quantifier, ' $\mathbf{M}p(\Phi p)$ ' is not equivalent to either a conjunction or a disjunction of substituends. Instead, it expresses a sufficiently high ratio of true to false substitution instances. What counts as sufficiently high will depend upon the use to which such reliability attributions are being put. Ordinary notions of reliability are probably quite vague on this score.

⁸ For more on the logic of generalized quantifiers such as 'most' see Barwise and Cooper (1981) and Keenan and Stavi (1986).

If attributions of less than perfect reliability are as common as I think they are, and if I am correct in analyzing such attributions as combinations of quantificational prosentences and devices of semantic ascent, this implies the existence of the following type of quantificational prosentence that seems to have escaped the notice of prosentential theorists

(34) ‘ $\mathbf{M}p(S \text{ said that } p \ \& \ \psi p/p)$ ’.

Examples of quantificational prosentences using the generalized quantifier ‘most’ include

(35) Most of the time Harry’s Superbowl predictions are correct.

(36) Most of what lawyers for the tobacco industry say is false.

It seems that explicit attributions of less than perfect reliability are much more common than free-standing attributive uses of quantificational prosentences that employ generalized quantifiers. In any case, those reliability attributions will be properly analyzed using quantificational prosentences – just like quantificational prosentences that employ the universal quantifier.

VII.

Prosententialists, then, are mistaken in thinking that prosentences cannot be used to attribute any properties. Quantificational prosentences can be used attributively as implicit attributions of reliability. Such prosentences can be used to explicate the logical structure of explicit attributions of reliability, which merely make explicit aspects of the conceptual content that are implicit in quantificational prosentences. Recognizing the attributive use of prosentences does not constitute a significant departure from the fundamentals of the prosentential theory of truth. It also does not conflict with the prosentential theory’s central contention that the truth predicate does not ascribe a substantive property to propositions. Attributive uses of prosentences – like other uses of prosentences – retain the function of making claims about extralinguistic reality.

Department of Philosophy
106 Coates Hall
Louisiana State University
Baton Rouge, LA, 70803-3901
 USA

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